The Cold War is over. Russia is weak and corrupt. Her population is advancing in age. It will take many years for this troubled country to get on her feet economically.
She is different, certainly less aggressive since the collapse of the Soviet empire -no longer a threat to the West. There is no turning back to the cold war. These observations from Western politicians about the current situation in Europe are frequently heard in Baltic countries and other small states. Perhaps such simplifications reflect a "realpolitik" posture. On the other hand, they may result from shortsighted political calculations -or from simple-minded miscalculations. Regardless of whichever simplifications might be applicable, Western politicians certainly understand "that a large scale confrontation between United States and Russia, NATO and Russia, and China and Russia would be catastrophic for the international security environment". 1 This catastrophic confrontation would affect many including the Baltic States.
These Baltic States, along with many former Warsaw Pact states, are fearful of Russia, an expected outcome from their recent post World War II experiences of Soviet terror and atrocities. In addition, it must be understood that Russia's unique geographic location as a mammoth Eurasian territory, its turbulent history, and its self-imposed isolation from the West during the Soviet era have greatly influenced this country's attitude and differentiated it from Western culture. Therefore, there should be no surprise that the Russian Federation views the West with anxious suspicion. As the famous Russian sociologist, Eduard Ponarin dramatically stated:
Since the end of the Cold War, Russians have encountered a powerful, alien culture that makes them feel powerless, disadvantaged, and inferior. Globalization has nurtured the emergence of global culture rooted in the North-European Protestant ethics and epitomized by US culture.
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It is perhaps true that the Soviet system will never return: Its ineffectuality has been indisputably exposed. But it also true that Russia has failed to democratize since the collapse of the Soviet Union. As the great Eastern Europe expert, Edward Lucas observed: "The most catastrophic mistake the outside world has made since 1991 is to assume that Russia is steadily becoming a normal country". 3 Obviously, during the last twenty years, Russia missed the opportunity to develop into a stable democratic state.
Her first President, Boris Yeltsin reformation efforts failed and he handed off a nation in economic chaos to the autocratic Vladimir Putin. This former Russian President and current prime minister has proclaimed that the collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century. 4 As Russia attempts to find a viable way into the new century, a troubled United States is wavering in its leadership of NATO, which was initially formed to confront Soviet aggression and expansionism. This Highlights a regional concern and provides evidence of Moscow's efforts to modernize, as she is ready to give up her traditional reliance on domestic military production because she drastically lags behind advanced western technologies. Integration of these ships into the Russian Navy will enable notably enhanced land intervention operations from the sea. The acquisition of this ability to intervene from the sea puts Baltic security at risk. exercise since the end of the Cold War. This exercise was officially described as "purely defensive". However, to many Western observers it seemed like a cold war era exercise: Its scenario concentrated on repelling a NATO-led attack on Belarus. An even broader exercise has been planned by both Russia and Belarus for 2013. 15 The Russia -Georgian war affirms that these exercises sometimes evolve to the real wars. Russian will be less of the threat in the next decade. 22 However, the current Russian rearmament and military reform does not portend a threat-free future.
As further proof, the Kremlin's active information operations campaign recently launched via mass media promotes its military reform. It clearly targets two audiences:
It assures the domestic audience that its government is providing national security, and it informs the rest of the world that Russia has regained its military muscle and is once again worthy of superpower status. 
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BS Military Development and Cooperation since the Beginning of Independence
The collapse of USSR put the Baltic States into a new unfamiliar and uncertain strategic situation. Certainly, as these states became independent, they immediately sought to rid themselves of Soviet Union power structures and to establish their own national institutions. Despite initial prospect of cordial relations with Russia, several disputes and disagreements quickly surfaced regarding treatment of Russian-speaking minorities, the final status of borders, economical relations, and disposition of Russian armed forces. The complexity and intensity of these issues led these Baltic States to seek security guarantees from the West. 37 All three countries began building their own militaries at almost at the same time. They also sought membership in international organizations.
The Baltic States urgently placed membership in NATO their highest but also most challenging priority. Some of NATO's and other older European democracies, such as Germany and Scandinavian countries, were not eager to welcome former Soviet states into the organization. These countries preferred to provide "soft power" support to the Baltic States, rather than allying themselves as providers of "hard power". This membership in NATO, the world's most powerful alliance lulled some
Lithuanian and Latvian politicians into a false sense of security. Instead of strengthening their defense, the two countries focused on professionalization of their militaries.
Despite a strong recommendation from NATO to spend no less than 2% of their GDP on defense, Lithuanian and Latvian governments only contributed around 1%.
According the NATO 2011 Press Release Lithuania's military spending approached only 0.9%, while Latvians invested only 1.0% of their GDP on defense. 40 Clearly, the recent global financial crises seriously affected the economies of Latvia and Lithuania, forcing their governments to dramatically reduce their defense budgets. In contrast, Estonians managed to fulfill the NATO requirement to allocate 2% of GDP to defense spending in 2012. 41 This serious problem creates disparity in the development of the Baltic States' militaries and friction between their politicians. Therefore, Lithuanian and Latvian political leaders must address this problem quickly and positively.
Nevertheless, the economic crises had positively hastened joint defense procurement among the three Baltic countries which also synchronizing national acquisition plans in order to eliminate differences in armament and equipment contributed by each country. 42 Moreover, Russia's tangible threat from the East clearly pushes the three Baltic countries to seek rapid solutions in cooperative regional defense. Beside positive strategic efforts to build a collective defense, more has to be done at the operational and tactical levels. programs designed to free and protect a society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency) 44 and Military Assistance (MA -broad spectrum of measures in support of friendly forces throughout the spectrum of conflict). 45 It is in these mission areas that the GPF to achieve the required synchronization and successfully accomplish these joint operations, SOF plays a significant role as both a synchronizer and force multiplier.
Finally and most importantly, having a SOF capability requires a relatively small expenditure of total defense cost. According the NATO Special Operations Coordination
Center (NSCC) assessment the price of training and equipping domestic SOF comparing with operating cost of expensive Air and Naval forces acquisition is much lower and enables a significant strategic capability. 48 All facts mentioned above, provide ample support to the continued development of national SOF capabilities whereas and more importantly encourage similar trilateral cooperation between national GPF of the Baltic States.
SOF as an Example of Multinational Interoperability
The Past. Commanders emphasized the importance of full and essential cooperation between both countries. 56 In remote Afghanistan, a combined Lithuanian and Latvian Special
Operations Task Force launched the potential for a collective defense of the Baltic's.
Conclusions
The world today remains extremely volatile and fussy. Furthermore, as the economies and societies integrate, our world affected by these processes of globalization, changes rapidly. Unfortunately, not all of that change is good. Given that military power remains one of the most important tools in implementing policies around the globe and often serves as a primary instrument in deterrence, the Baltic States' militaries must be rapidly integrated into a collective defense force in order to deal with the emerging threat from Russia. Therefore, Baltic leaders must swiftly address current disparities in the Baltic States' military spending. Hence, despite current fiscal problems, political leaders in Latvia and Lithuania must also find ways to maintain the current size of their militaries and gradually increase their defense budgets.
In addition to increasing spending and matching military budgets, Baltic strategic leaders must try to take the unique abilities and cultural adaptability of SOF and export it to benefit the security of the entire Baltic region. These leaders must also consider the cooperative capacity of Baltic Special Operations Forces as a vehicle through which the three country's militaries could eventually integrate into a common defense system. 
